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THE “PITILESS DOUBLE ABUSE” OF
BATTERED MOTHERS+
JUSTINE A. DUNLAP∗
Mothers are expected to do and be all for their children, and those
who fall short are criticized. Elizabeth Schneider makes this
unassailable assertion in her book Battered Women and Feminist
Lawmaking.1
In the chapter entitled Motherhood and Battering,
Schneider argues that society reserves its greatest opprobrium for
mothers who harm their children or who are perceived to stand idly
2
by while others harm their children. As Schneider demonstrates,
women who fail to protect their children, even if they attempt to do
3
so, can be legally liable and soundly condemned. This ill-conceived
accountability is most likely to occur when the mother is herself a
victim of violence. Thus the dangerous confluence of two powerful
archetypes—being a mother and being battered—inflicts double
injury on women who wear both mantles. They not only bear the
scars of their abuser, but they also shoulder the blame for the harms
4
others cause to their children.
+

Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153, 163 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
Director of Clinical Programs, Southern New England School of Law (on leave);
Visiting Associate Professor, University of Baltimore, Family Law Clinic. B.A., 1979, The
Ohio State University; J.D., 1982, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. I thank
Ingrid Hillinger for her helpful review of this essay in its draft form.
1. See ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN & FEMINIST LAWMAKING 150
(2000) (noting the general cultural attitude that mothers can and should sacrifice
anything for their children).
2. See id. at 148 (“Battered women who are mothers are reviled.”).
3. See, e.g., Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153, 168 (E.D.N.Y. 2002)
(pointing out that plaintiff Nicholson makes sure her children are cared for while
she is in school or working, by either taking them with her, taking them to daycare,
or providing for a babysitter). Despite her efforts, the city removed her children
from her care after an incident of battering by her partner and later charged her
with neglect. See id. at 169-71. On April 4, 2003, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
heard arguments in the appeal of the district court’s decision in Nicholson. See
Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153 (E.D.N.Y. 2002), appeal docketed, No. 027079 (2d Cir. Jan. 23, 2002).
4. The “other” involved here is the known “other,” most likely the intimate
“other,” as it would be exceedingly unlikely that a woman would be blamed for harm
to a child caused by a stranger unless, of course, the mother had left the child
∗
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A battered woman is stereotyped as weak, helpless, incapable or
5
unwilling to redress the situation in which she finds herself. This
stereotype faults the battered woman for her batterer’s actions. For
battered mothers, this notion is compounded. As Schneider points
out, the battered mother is stereotyped as possessing weaknesses that
prevent her from caring for her children or, worse yet, encourage her
6
to choose her abuser over her children.
Children living in homes where their mothers are battered can
suffer physical harm in many ways. Of course, a batterer might
7
intentionally abuse a child as well as an intimate. A battered woman
herself is more likely to abuse her child than is a woman who is not
8
abused. Children can also be caught in the crossfire and suffer
accidental injury. Children, particularly adolescents and especially
adolescent boys, are often injured while attempting to protect their
9
mothers. In addition to physical harm, children who are exposed to
domestic violence can be harmed in non-physical ways. Recent data
has shown that children who witness domestic violence are subject to
10
various emotional and psychological harms.
This data has been
11
used to limit a batterer’s right to custody. It has also been used to
inappropriately in the care of such a stranger; then she might be called to account
for that choice.
5. See Ruth Jones, Guardianship for Coercively Controlled Battered Women: Breaking
the Control of the Abuser, 88 GEO. L.J. 605, 628 (2000) (noting the many “theories”
attached to battered women, among them battered women’s syndrome and survivor
theory). In an article that takes the learned helplessness explicit in battered
women’s syndrome to an extreme, Ruth Jones suggests that some women are
“coercively controlled battered women” who lack the ability to act on their own
behalf and for whom there should be state intervention in the form of guardianship.
Id.
6. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 154 (noting that battered women are often
forced to choose between their children and their battering partner).
7. See id. at 152 (citing studies that show a high correlation between child and
“intimate other” abuse).
8. The data on this is mixed. While one expert in Nicholson testified that the
“man hits wife, wife hits child” scenario is rare, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 197, others show it
to be more common. See, e.g., Howard A. Davidson, Child Abuse and Domestic Violence:
Legal Connections and Controversies, 29 FAM. L.Q. 357, 359 (1995) (noting that some
parents who are victims of domestic violence are also the perpetrators of child
abuse).
9. See generally Lois A. Weithorn, Protecting Children from Exposure to Domestic
Violence: The Use and Abuse of Child Maltreatment, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 83 (2001)
(describing incidents in which children were injured while attempting to protect
their mothers from her abusive partner).
10. Although all children who witness domestic violence may be subject to
increased risk, the evidence shows that not all such children actually suffer harm.
See, e.g., Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 197 (finding that children’s responses to
witnessing domestic violence can vary from little or none to serious, depending on a
wide variety of factors, such as the child’s age and the extent of the violence).
11. See, e.g., In re Vaughn, 664 N.E.2d 434, 437 (Mass. 1996) (stating that abuse,
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penalize battered women by charging them with failing to protect
their children.
12
Schneider opines that the hallowed status of motherhood should
render it shocking that much woman abuse commences during
13
pregnancy. Likewise, it should be similarly shocking that authorities
remove a battered woman’s child from her care because the child has
seen his or her mother battered. But exactly this scenario forms the
basis of a class action lawsuit in New York City against, inter alia, the
14
Administration for Children’s Services (“ACS”).
This Essay
examines that lawsuit in light of Schneider’s chapter on Motherhood
and Battering in Women and Feminist Lawmaking.
15

“SUFFERING AND TRAUMA” BEYOND MEASURE
In January 2001, battered women and their children filed a class
16
action against ACS for its removal of children from battered
mothers because the mothers had “engaged in” domestic violence by
17
being battered. On January 3, 2002, United States District Court
Judge Jack Weinstein issued a preliminary injunction barring ACS
from separating children from their mother based on the fact that
the mother was considered to engage in domestic violence by being a
18
victim. That injunction was followed by an extensive supplemental
19
memorandum on March 18, 2002. He began his strongly worded
by and of any family member, must be accounted for when determining the best
interests of the child, specifically when a custody decree is at issue).
12. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 149 (discussing motherhood as the “greatest
joy” in some women’s lives).
Paradoxically, motherhood also has another,
subordinating function. See id. (identifying as “a principal way that women are
shackled to an inferior status . . . .”).
13. See id. at 150 (noting that “[f]orty percent of assaults by male partners begin
during a woman’s first pregnancy . . . .”) (citations omitted).
14. See generally Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 153.
15. Id. at 251.
16. Individual women and children filed suits in 2000, but did not seek class
certification until January 2001. See id. at 164-65.
17. See In re Nicholson, 181 F. Supp. 2d 182, 184 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (amended
memorandum, order and preliminary injunction) (noting that ACS had
systematically and repeatedly removed children of battered mothers because the
mothers had “engaged in” domestic violence by being victims).
18. See id. at 183 (issuing a preliminary injunction against ACS because of the
“serious and imminent danger to plaintiffs caused by defendants’ continuing
constitutional violations” of plaintiffs’ rights).
19. See Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 165 (describing the chain of events in the
case). The court ordered the certification of two subclasses, one of children and one
of parents, primarily mothers, and, during the summer of 2001, weeks of testimony
in the preliminary injunction. See id. The court also stayed the preliminary
injunction for a period of six months to allow the City of New York time to correct its
constitutionally flawed ways. See id.
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memorandum by acknowledging that the ACS practice constituted
widespread cruelty against battered mothers, a practice that he
20
Judge Weinstein
characterizes as “pitiless double abuse.”
understood the predicament of battered mothers and set about to
21
correct it.
The list of wrongs ACS perpetrated against battered mothers and,
22
by extension, their children, is long indeed. The city would pursue
reports of neglect against mothers when the sole allegation was that
23
the mother had “engaged in domestic violence.” Arguably, this is a
reasonable—or, at least, not a constitutionally offensive policy—until
one uncovers the meaning of “engaged in domestic violence.”
24
Notwithstanding a suggestion of mutuality by combatants implied in
the phrase “engaged in domestic violence,” here it meant that the
mother had been battered, and perhaps had the audacity to be abused
25
while her children were present.
ACS was aware that the phraseology “engaged in domestic
violence” and its underlying policy were misguided. The agency’s
director of Domestic Violence Policy and Planning testified that the
language distorted the dynamics of domestic violence but that no one
told the legal arm of ACS to use new language because that would
require telling “them what would be appropriate language [to use]
26
instead.” It is hard to determine which is worse: the director not
taking the time to advise the legal players of “appropriate” language,
her willingness to admit it, or the legal team’s apparent inability to
craft suitable language in the petitions they file.
20. Id. at 163.
21. In so doing, however, Judge Weinstein makes some sweeping statements that,
while utopian, bear no basis to reality. For instance, he asserts that physical abuse of
mothers and children, or the threat thereof, “is not tolerated in our American
society.” Id. at 164. Well, one need not be steeped in feminist principles to
challenge the validity of that statement. Indeed, Weinstein’s own opinion,
recounting the class action suits against the City of New York for the institutionalized
maltreatment of children, belies this assertion. See id. at 194-96. This illustrates well
the paradox, recognized in In re Vaughn, that domestic violence is “both intolerable
and too readily tolerated.” 664 N.E.2d 434, 437 (Mass. 1996).
22. Weinstein leaves no doubt that the children, a separate subclass in the cause
of action, are victims of the city’s policy. He states that “as a matter of policy and
practice, ACS does not merely fail to advance the best interests of children . . . they
harm children.” Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 250-51.
23. Id. at 214.
24. Of course, one of the dilemmas of domestic violence is that mutuality is often
asserted when there is none or self-defense is reconfigured as mutuality and
necessary relief for the non-aggressor is then withheld.
25. See Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 168-93 (providing case histories of the ten
plaintiffs, all victims of domestic violence, who were sometimes abused in the
presence of their children).
26. Id.
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Experts in the lawsuit testified that one of the reasons that ACS
seeks to hold mothers accountable over 90% of the time while
proceeding against the batterer in just over 50% of the cases is that
the mother is the “focal point” of the child abuse and neglect
27
system.
This point is consistent with Schneider’s theme that
mothers bear primary responsibility for children. Thus, when
childrearing goes awry, mothers also bear the primary burden,
evidenced by the percentage of cases brought against battered
28
mothers in contrast to cases filed against the abuser.
Further, Judge Weinstein found an ACS “agency-wide practice of
removing children . . . without evidence of a mother’s neglect and
29
without seeking prior court approval.” ACS removed children for
any of several reasons, including an agency policy that resolved any
ambiguity in favor of removal and as a way to “motivat[e]” the mother
30
to cooperate with ACS. The judge found that return of children
31
who had been removed was also fraught with difficulty. Although
32
some returns were delayed due to “administrative inefficiency,”
other children were kept from their mothers simply because the
33
According to Weinstein, the
agency had the power to do so.
untimely returns were explained by reasons unrelated to protecting
34
children. Those reasons include employee pique and the power to
punish or coerce the mother and child into compliance with agency

27. See id. at 209, 211 (maintaining that historically, ACS has not given fathers
much attention and does not expect that they will participate in referral services).
28. See id. at 210 (reporting that ACS “prosecutes the victim of domestic violence
for neglect in Family Court in approximately 935 cases a year . . . [whereas] [t]he
abusive partner is charged with causing harm to the child by engaging in domestic
violence in only 15.4% of cases.”). It is worth noting that it is possible that the
abusing men could not have been respondents in child dependency charges because
they were neither biologically parents nor acting in loco parentis. Of course, the
absence of a parental nexus would not preclude the filing of criminal child
endangerment charges.
29. Id. at 215.
30. See id. (indicating that ACS often delays judicial approval of the removal to
first attempt to “work things out with the mother.”).
31. See id. at 216 (finding that ACS unnecessarily delays the return of separated
children to their mothers even after the Family Court has ordered their reunion).
32. See id. (citing employee abuse of power as reason for delay in many
instances).
33. See id. (stating that ACS could remove a child without judicial approval simply
on the basis of suspicion of future harm to child, or merely on information
submitted in the first report prior to conducting an investigation).
34. “Untimely” is often used in legal parlance. But untimely, under the facts of
some of the Nicholson plaintiffs, included weeks passing without visits between mother
and children, missed birthdays, and illness and physical harm to the children while
in the care of foster parents. See id. at 168-69.
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35

fiat. Pitiless double abuse indeed.
Judge Weinstein found that it was ACS’s pervasive practice to treat
36
mothers unfairly as a group. Such pervasive governmental practice,
he said, ran afoul of the Fourth, Ninth, Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and
37
Nineteenth Amendments. Moreover, the judge declared that the
constitutionally offensive and affirmatively harmful separation of
children from their battered mothers rested on “false assumptions
and findings . . . that she [the mother] permitted or encouraged her
38
own mistreatment.” The court credited expert testimony that ACS
policy and training were based on antiquated views of domestic
39
violence. Those views result in assumptions that battered women
40
“suffer from learned helplessness.” The judge further found that
the city, as a policy and practice, had failed to investigate what steps
the battered mother had taken to protect her children, and what
services the agency could have offered to bolster the mother’s
41
individual attempts.
This failure is consistent with the harsh judgment and facile
solutions visited upon the battered woman. The specter of learned
helplessness hangs over her and rarely, if ever, is she credited with
taking appropriate steps to protect herself and her children. The
label of “battered woman” has stuck with societal force. With the
second label of “battered mother” superimposed over the first, she
stands virtually no chance of being viewed as a competent, loving
42
mother. If this conclusion were ever in doubt, one only need look
as far as the findings in Judge Weinstein’s order to confirm the
pernicious effects of the stereotype.
A mother’s status as “battered” is the complicating factor. If the
woman were simply a “mother,” rather than a “battered mother,” she
would be deemed capable of foreseeing and tending to all of her
children’s needs. Indeed, no less would be accepted from her, as
societal expectations of the “good mother” would be the norm. But,
35. Id. at 216.
36. Id. at 248.
37. See id. (finding that separating a mother from her children solely because she
has been abused violates her constitutional rights).
38. Id. at 252.
39. See id. at 217 (explaining that caseworker training at ACS inadequately equips
workers to “recognize or even address the essential dynamics of domestic violence.”).
40. Id.
41. See id. at 250 (noting that as a matter of practice, ACS removes children
before investigating a particular situation).
42. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 154 (suggesting that society has difficulty
imaging that a woman who is battered could be a good mother).
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as Schneider points out, women as mothers are cast in one of only
43
two possible roles: the “good mother” or the “bad mother.” In this
binary system, if the woman is not the “good mother,” she is the “bad
mother.” She is a mother who is not all-sacrificing, who has chosen—
ostensibly by her behavior or her own “poor” choices—to be placed
in another, unacceptable role. There is little or no societal hesitation
in this rush to judgment. Nor is there questioning of whether this
recasting is warranted. No one asks whether it is the woman’s own
behavior that is fault-worthy. To ask the question is to give the
answer: it is not the woman’s behavior, but rather that of the batterer,
that is to blame.
It is no surprise that the child abuse and neglect system blames the
mother. The expert testimony in Nicholson v. Williams demonstrates
44
45
this, as does Schneider. The mother is the focal point of the abuse
system and, therefore, the available blame inexorably is hers.
Occasionally, of course, the abuser may be nominally “blamed”; for
example, he may be named in the neglect petition along with the
46
mother. In the way of real consequences, however, the battered
mother still absorbs the lion’s share, even if the batterer is named in
court proceedings. First, if the children are removed, they are taken
from their mother and she will have to deal with the trauma—both
hers and theirs—flowing from the removal. Next, even if the system
tags the abuser as deserving of blame, it is the battered mother who
must achieve the only goal that matters: return of the children and
cessation of state interference. Often, the conditions she must satisfy
are boilerplate, punitive, unnecessary, intrusive, and quite
47
conceivably, affirmatively harmful. Yet if she fails to jump through
these bureaucratic hoops, the return of her children will be delayed.
Ironically, the battered mother who takes affirmative steps to help
herself and her children is most likely to become entangled with the
48
As both the Nicholson case and Schneider
child welfare system.
43. Id. at 152.
44. See Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 211 (citing expert testimony explaining that
ACS targets mothers who are victims of domestic violence).
45. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 153 (explaining that the battered mother is
likely to be held responsible for child abuse or neglect because of her presumed
failure to protect her children, or because of her silence).
46. See, e.g., Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 209 (highlighting testimony indicating
that abusers were named in petitions some 50% of the time, and that battered
mothers were named over 90% of the time).
47. See generally id. at 253 (finding that “the city’s practices and policies in this
field harm children much more than they protect against harm.”).
48. In the District of Columbia, a woman who seeks help in getting a civil
protection order through the Domestic Violence Intrake Center, a coordinated
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demonstrate, women whose battering results in contact with the
49
“system” risk losing their children. It may not matter whether the
contact is spontaneous—such as a telephone call to 911 during or
immediately after an assault—or voluntary, such as a court
appearance to seek a protection order.
The battered mother faces a Hobson’s choice. If she does nothing
“official” regarding her abuse, her lack of action may be labeled a
“failure to protect” her child if the matter otherwise comes to the
attention of the authorities. This is true even if her “unofficial”
private actions are focused solely on the protection of herself and her
children. She may indeed be the self-sacrificing “good mother,” even
substituting herself as a punching bag for the batterer in lieu of her
children. She does so, however, in a way that is hidden from view and
misunderstood.
On the other hand, if she does voluntarily choose to seek help
from official sources, she may be reported to the child welfare system
for doing precisely what society expects of her and precisely what she
must do to avoid condemnation. Imagine the absurdity: a battered
woman seeks help for herself and, by direct implication, her children
by seeking the law’s protection from her batterer. And the law’s
response? To charge the battered mother criminally or civilly for
50
failing to protect her child. As Mr. Bumble once remarked, “the law
51
is an ass . . . .”
In her Motherhood and Battering chapter, Elizabeth Schneider
foretells many of the problems that are so vividly apparent in the
Nicholson case. Judge Weinstein’s lengthy and openly critical opinion
may well be considered a victory of feminist lawmaking in the area of
intake facility run by five private and public agencies, risks being reported to the
child abuse hotline if she is interviewed by an employee of the Office of Corporation
Counsel, an agency also responsible for prosecuting child abuse and neglect cases. A
report, even if unfounded, can have severe and lasting consequences. Furthermore,
the potential is enormous for such a policy to discourage women from receiving the
help that they need and the help that they will be blamed for not getting.
49. See Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 173-76 (noting that one of the plaintiffs,
April Rodriguez, lost custody of her three children after she reported a domestic
violence incident to the police, which resulted in the batterer’s arrest). Shockingly,
the batterer, who was the children’s father, received custody of the children. Id.; see
also SCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 153 (explaining that battered women may be charged
with criminal conduct, held liable for abuse and neglect, or have their parental rights
terminated because they are presumed to have failed to protect the welfare of the
child).
50. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 159-67 (discussing several cases in which the
state prosecuted a battered mother on charges such as first-degree murder,
manslaughter, child abuse, and child neglect).
51. CHARLES DICKENS, OLIVER TWIST 354 (Kathleen Tillotson ed., Oxford Univ.
Press 1966) (1838).
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battered mothers. This trial court opinion, however, is only the first
52
step, since the case is being appealed. The final result and impact of
Nicholson, along with any ability it may have to ameliorate some of the
problems that plague battered mothers and their children, will be
eagerly awaited by battered mothers and domestic violence advocates
alike.

52. See supra note 3.
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